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ABSTRACT  
This article explores the implications of D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] 
QB 161, a recent decision of the Court of Appeal in which two victims of a serial rapist 
successfully sued the Metropolitan police for investigative failures relying on Article 3 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998. The article reflects 
upon the extent to which English Courts are willing to recognise a duty to investigate within 
the wider context of civil claims against the police, particularly with regard to failures arising 
from the investigation of crimes of sexual and domestic violence.  The comparative scope of 
tort and human rights claims is also considered along with the evolving jurisprudential trend 
towards drawing a firm line between the two kinds of claim.  
 
KEY WORDS 
Human rights, duty to investigate, police, rape, tort 
  
2 
 
INTRODUCTION  
For some time now, the question of police attitudes to and conduct of rape complaints has 
been in the British public eye. A damning succession of studies1 has catalogued police 
failings, from initial reporting through to final disposition of a case, generating a mountain 
of data evidencing deep structural, institutional, and cultural problems going to the heart of 
the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Located within a broader policy context of 
growing concern over conviction and/or attrition rates for rape2 and set against a backdrop 
of substantial rape law reform, not just in England and Wales but around the globe, police 
handling of rape investigations has attracted repeated criticism and public scrutiny. 
Prominent concerns emerging from the extensive literature include a sustained culture of 
suspicion directed at complainants, poor record-keeping, widespread misuse of ‘no-criming’, 
sloppy witness follow-up and evidence-gathering, and lack of adequate senior officer 
                                                          
1 G Chambers & A Millar Investigating Sexual Assault (Edinburgh: Scottish Office Central Research Unit, 1983); I 
Blair Investigating Rape: A New Approach for Police (London: Croom Helm/ The Police Foundation, 1985); J 
Harris & S Grace A Question of Evidence: Investigating and Prosecuting Rape in the 1990s (London: Home 
Office, 1999); J Gregory & S Lees Policing Sexual Assault (London: Routledge, 1999); Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Inspectorate Joint Inspection into the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Rape Offences in England and Wales (London: HMCPSI and HMIC, 2002); HMCPSI Without 
Consent: A Report on the Joint Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Rape Offences (London: HMCPSI 
and HMIC, 2007); HMCPSI Forging the Links: Rape Investigation and Prosecution: A Joint Inspection by HMIC 
and HMCPSI (London: HMCPSI and HMIC, 2012); A Feist, J Ashe, J Lawrence, D McPhee,  & R Wilson 
Investigating and Detecting Recorded Offences of Rape. London: Home Office Online Report 18/07 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/http:/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/rdsolr1
807.pdf (last accessed 12th April 2016); V Stern A Report by Baroness Vivien Stern CBE of an Independent 
Review into How Rape Complaints are Handled by Public Authorities in England and Wales (London: Home 
Office, 2010); K Hohl & E Stanko ‘Complaints of Rape and the Criminal Justice System: Fresh Evidence on the 
Attrition Problem in England and Wales’ (2015) 12 European Journal of Criminology 324; and E Angiolini Report 
of the Independent Review into the Investigation and Prosecution of Rape in London 
(http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/equality/vaw/dame_elish_angiolini_rape_review_2015.pdf, last 
accessed 16th November 2015).  
2 During the early 2000s, the conviction rate in rape cases became the focus of intense public scrutiny as 
figures revealed that only about 6% of reported rapes resulted in a rape conviction: L Kelly, J Lovett & L Regan 
A Gap or a Chasm: Attrition in Reported Rape Cases. Home Office Research Study 293 (London: Home Office, 
2005). As a proportion of cases reported, the conviction rate has continued to hover troublingly around 6-7% 
although more recently, the accuracy and significance of the ‘6%’ figure has been questioned on the grounds 
that it relies on inappropriate measures and comparisons yielding misleading results: Stern, above n 1. 
Subsequent studies have sought to ensure greater commensurability in data calculations and few doubt that a 
serious problem of attrition exists in rape cases, ie that a troubling high proportion of cases fall out of the 
criminal justice system at all stages. Much ink has been spilled trying to ascertain the reasons for this falling off 
of claims: see most recently Ministry of Justice and the Home Office (MOJHO) An Overview of Sexual Offending 
in England and Wales (London: Ministry of Justice, Home Office and Office for National Statistics, 2013). The 
potential scale of the problem is further amplified when one considers that the number of reported cases is 
likely only a fraction of the number of actual incidents in any given year: ibid, Ch 2. 
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supervision.3 Time and time again, the public is reassured that lessons have been learned, 
mistakes corrected, policies put in place, and specialist training undertaken only to have 
hopes dashed by yet another statistic, study, or public outcry. One cannot but despair at the 
seeming intractability of the problem. What does it take to bring about the transformative 
cultural and institutional changes clearly required?      
To date, consideration of this issue has generally taken place within the context of criminal 
justice reform and policy. The focus of this article is otherwise; its purpose to explore the 
role civil justice might play in navigating this tricky terrain. Could civil claims against the 
police provide a means of calling individual police actors to account for their poor handling 
of rape complaints as well promoting positive change in police practices? The idea of using 
civil litigation to prompt changes in policing is not new. A growing, multi-jurisdictional 
literature has emerged exploring the merits of civil litigation against the police, both as a 
mechanism of accountability and catalyst for change.4 This literature charts the rise of civil 
litigation against the police from the second half of the twentieth century,5 its general 
merits and effects,6 and the role of activist and practitioner networks - coalescing around 
issues of race and gender in particular - in shaping the changing landscape of police liability.7 
While jurisdictions differ as to the conditions and scope of liability, there is increasing 
acknowledgment of the regulatory potential of civil actions within the broad and complex 
framework of accountability mechanisms governing policing and an emerging consensus 
                                                          
3 See eg HMCPSI Report 2012 and Angiolini, above n 1.  
4 B Dixon & G Smith, ‘Laying Down the Law: the Police, the Courts and Legal Accountability’ (1998) 26 
International Journal of Sociology of Law 419; C Epp Making Rights Real: Activists, Bureaucrats and the 
Creation of the Legalistic State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); C Harlow, ‘Damages and Human 
Rights’ (2004) New Zealand L Rev 420; K Horsey, ‘Trust in the Police? Police Negligence, Invisible Immunity and 
Disadvantaged Claimants’ in J Richardson & E Rackley (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Tort Law (Routledge 2012 
80); L Hoyano, ‘Policing Flawed Police Investigations: Unravelling the Blanket’ (1999) 62 Modern L Rev 912; J 
McCulloch and D Palmer, Civil Litigation by Citizens against Australian Police between 1994 and 2002 
(Canberra Australia: Criminology Research Council, 2005); J Ransley, J Anderson, & T Prenzler ‘Civil Litigation 
against Police in Australia: Exploring its Extent, Nature and Implications for Accountability’ (2007) 40 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 143; E Sheehy (ed) Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legislation and 
Women’s Activism (Ottowa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012); G Smith, ‘Actions for Damages against the 
Police and Attitudes of Claimants’  (2003) 13/4 Policing & Society 413. 
5 Smith; McCulloch & Palmer; Ransley et al (above n 4). 
6 Compare eg R Clayton & H Tomlinson, Civil Actions Against the Police 3rd ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) 
6-17, adopting a sceptical approach to civil actions as a mechanism of police accountability and control with 
Epp, above n 4, offering a far more positive assessment of the same; for a summary of the mixed views 
reflected in the literature, see McCulloch & Palmer, above n 4, 84-90 and for analysis of reasons for resorting 
to litigation, see Smith above n 4. 
7 Epp, above n 4 (focusing on race); Sheehy, above n 4 (highlighting gender, and in particular rape).    
4 
 
that rising levels of litigation reflect a lack of public confidence in other mechanisms of 
redress, bureaucratic or political.8  
At first glance, however, scope for the deployment of civil remedies in English law to 
counter police investigative failures looks decidedly limited. As any tort lawyer will confirm, 
the English judiciary has traditionally adopted an unsympathetic stance towards civil claims 
derived from the public duty the police owe to preserve the peace by investigating and 
suppressing crime.9 This restrictive stance emanates from a decision of the House of Lords 
in 1989. In Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police,10 the police were unsuccessfully 
sued for failings relating to the investigation and apprehension of the Yorkshire Ripper, a 
notorious serial killer preying on women in the North of England during the 1980s.  Denying 
the police owed a duty of care to Jacqueline Hill, the last victim of the Yorkshire Ripper and 
on whose behalf her family brought a claim, the House of Lords held that the relationship 
between Jacqueline and the West Yorkshire police was insufficiently proximate to give rise 
to a duty of care: she was but one of a large class of potential victims at risk of harm from 
the Ripper. Their Lordships also took the view that public policy considerations militated 
against recognition of a duty of care. In particular, the imposition of civil liability on the 
police for failing to protect members of the public from injuries inflicted by unknown 
criminal third parties risked ‘significantly divert[ing] police manpower and attention from 
their most important function, that of the suppression of crime’.11 
Repeated efforts have since been made to open the avenue of liability shut down in Hill12; 
these for the most part have failed, certainly in relation to claims against the police,13 and a 
                                                          
8 See eg Clayton & Tomlinson, above n 4, 15; McCulloch & Palmer, above n 4, 90 and Smith, above n 4, 419-
420. 
9 The existence and content of this public duty is stated by Viscount Cave LC in Glasbrook v Glamorgan CC 
[1925] AC 270 in the following terms: ‘… there is an absolute and unconditional obligation binding the police 
authorities to take all steps which appear to them to be necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime, 
for protecting property from criminal injury’ (at 277). See also Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales [2015] 
UKSC 2 at [29-35] per Lord Toulson.   
10 [1989] 1 AC 53. 
11 Ibid, per L Keith at 63.   
12 See eg Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 ALL ER 344 (CA); Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 
[2005] UKHL 24; Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police; Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police 
[2008] UKHL 50.   
13 A rare exception is Swinney v CC Northumbria Police [1996] 3 All ER 449 in which a duty of care was 
recognised on the ground that the police had assumed responsibility for the safety of the claimant, a police 
informer in a murder investigation.  
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restrictive judicial position has recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Michael v 
Chief Constable of South Wales,14 a tragic case of domestic violence in which a young 
mother died following a police failure to respond promptly to her emergency 999 call. In 
Michael, a strong commitment to the ‘core principle in Hill’15 - is reiterated and the majority 
of the senior judiciary adhere staunchly to the view that the public duty of the police to 
preserve the peace does not - and should not - carry with it any private duty of care owed to 
individuals other than in the most carefully circumscribed circumstances.16 The received 
wisdom post-Michael is that negligence actions against the police for failures pertaining to 
their investigative and crime-suppressing functions are unlikely to get beyond a striking out 
application.  
Yet, just at the point when the boundaries of tort liability have been narrowly and decisively 
drawn, another route to suit is emerging, the scope and potential of which remains 
undetermined. This alternative approach involves the deployment of human rights, 
specifically the right enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) to sue a public authority 
for acting in a way which is incompatible with rights under the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR). Again, invoking human rights to counter the restrictiveness of judicial 
determinations regarding the parameters of public authority liability in negligence is hardly 
novel. In the 1990s, for example, after the decision in Osman v Ferguson17 in which the 
Court of Appeal expressed itself bound by Hill to strike out a claim against the police for 
failing to protect a family from the violent attentions of a stalker, an application by the 
Osman family to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) succeeded.18 The ECtHR held 
that the judicial application of an ‘exclusionary rule’ protecting the police from liability in 
negligence violated Article 6(1) ECHR, the right to a fair hearing, which includes a right to 
                                                          
14 [2015] UKSC 2. 
15 Ibid at [48].  
16 Ibid. An interesting shift in Michael is the move away from strong reliance on policy to ground the denial of 
liability in ‘common law principle’ (Lord Toulson at [116]). The formal position now appears to be that the 
police owe no private law duty of care capable of giving rise to an action in damages in the context of 
exercising their functions of investigating and suppressing crime unless there has been a representation by the 
police amounting to a voluntary assumption of responsibility which has been relied upon by the claimant (at 
[115]).  
17 Osman v Ferguson, above n 12. 
18 Osman v UK [1998] ECHR 101. 
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effective access to the courts.19 The ECtHR also considered the application of Article 2, the 
right to life, and, in particular, whether the positive obligation owed by the state to protect 
that right had been breached. While holding on the facts that it had not, the Court also 
specified the circumstances in which such a violation might occur: 
It must be established … that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the 
time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified 
individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to 
take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might 
have been expected to avoid that risk.20 
The subsequent case of Z v UK21 applied this principle to Article 3 (the right not to be subject 
to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment)22 holding that a local authority had breached 
its positive obligation under Article 3 by failing to protect a group of children from severe 
parental abuse and neglect. From, inter alia, these two cases, a Convention jurisprudence 
has developed detailing the nature and scope of public authority obligations to secure 
people’s rights under Articles 2 and 3, including obligations vested in the police and other 
criminal justice actors.23  
With the advent of the HRA, this jurisprudence acquired new potency in English courts. In 
Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police,24 the family of a trial witness shot dead 
by the accused brought a claim against the police, relying on sections 6 and 7 of the HRA, for 
breach of their obligation to secure Giles Van Colle’s right to life under Article 2 ECHR. The 
claim was upheld at first instance and by the Court of Appeal, but a further appeal by the 
                                                          
19 Art 6(1) ECHR: ‘… everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.’ The ECtHR decision on this point was widely criticised 
and in the later case of Z v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 3, the Court acknowledged that its reasoning in Osman was 
based on an ‘understanding of the law of negligence which has to be reviewed in the light of clarifications 
subsequently made by the domestic courts and notably the House of Lords’ at [100]. What the Court in Osman 
viewed as an immunity which breached the right of access to the courts and could not be shown to be 
proportionate, the Court in Z viewed as the judicial determination of the extent of application of the duty of 
care in particular circumstances, giving rise to no Art 6 issue whatsoever.    
20 Osman v UK, above n 18 at [116].  
21 Z v UK, above n 19.  
22 Art 3 ECHR ‘No one shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment’.  
23 See generally A Mowbray The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), chapters 2 & 3.  
24 [2008] UKHL 50. 
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police to the House of Lords was allowed on the grounds that the high threshold for liability 
set by the ECtHR in Osman had not been met, specifically, that from the information 
available, the police could not reasonably have anticipated a real and immediate risk to the 
victim’s life.25 The House of Lords thus acknowledged the possibility of a HRA claim against 
the police for failing to protect crime victims but only in Osman-prescribed circumstances. 
Subsequently, in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales,26 in which claims were lodged 
both in negligence and under the HRA, the Supreme Court approved the striking out of the 
negligence application but allowed the HRA claim to proceed to trial.27 There have also been 
instances of cases in which the police have settled claims brought by the families of 
domestic violence victims based on alleged violation of their Article 2 ECHR rights.28  
From this one can detect a slim but sturdy thread of English case law linking police failings in 
relation to the investigation and suppression of crime with positive obligations on the State 
‘to provide individuals with suitable measures of protection against immediate threats to 
their lives by third parties’.29 Can this assist rape victims whose complaints are poorly 
handled by the police? Into the frame steps D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis,30 
a recent Court of Appeal decision which may hold some potential to address the multiple 
concerns raised about the policing of sex crimes.  D is considered here both on its own 
merits and within the context of the broader legal framework in which tort and human 
rights claims appear to be on something of a collision course, at least when it comes to 
actions against the police. The picture is further complicated by the intention of the current 
Government to abolish the HRA and replace it with a British Bill of Rights.31  Can the evolving 
jurisprudence positing a police duty to investigate survive the anticipated demise of the 
HRA?  Upon what precise basis does the duty lie and what are its limits and scope? Does the 
imposition of liability in such circumstances provide an effective means of enabling rape 
                                                          
25 This decision was later upheld by the ECtHR in Van Colle v UK (2013) 45 EHRR 23. 
26 [2015] UKSC 2. 
27 Whether or not on the facts Michael will be deemed to have met the Osman threshold remains to be seen; 
at least one Court of Appeal judge thought there was no realistic prospect of success (Michael v Chief 
Constable of South Wales [2012] EWCA Civ 981 per at Davis LJ at [35]); the Supreme Court refrained from 
commenting on this point.  
28 See eg the tragic case of Cassie Hasanovic settled in early 2016, reported here: 
http://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/article/sussex-police-settle-human-rights-claim-following-domestic-
homicide 
29 Mowbray, above n 23, 15. 
30 [2016] QB 161(CA).    
31 ‘Plans to scrap Human Rights Act delayed again’ The Guardian 2 December 2015. 
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victims to call the police to account for egregious investigative failures? Might such 
litigation-led interventions also help to change institutional behaviour and public attitudes 
when it comes to the policing of gender-based violence? These questions shape and inform 
the analysis below. 
 
THE CASE OF THE BLACK CAB RAPIST 
D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis32 arose from the actions of a serial rapist, John 
Worboys, colloquially known as ‘the black cab rapist’. Worboys was a licenced London taxi 
driver who, for the better part of a decade, from 2002 to 2008, preyed upon vulnerable 
young women looking for a safe ride home after an evening out. Worboys drugged his 
victims before sexually assaulting them; consequently, their memory was impaired and their 
account of events often came across as confused. Worboys is thought to have committed 
well in excess of 100 rapes and sexual assaults during his prolonged crime spree before 
being arrested and charged in February 2008. In March 2009, he was convicted of 19 
criminal counts including rape, sexual assault and offences of administering a substance 
with intent to rape. He received an indeterminate sentence with a recommendation he 
serve a minimum of eight years imprisonment.  
The claimants, ‘D’ and ‘V’,33 were two of Worboys’ victims. D had been assaulted by 
Worboys in 2003; V in 2007. Both claimants reported their assaults to the police. However, 
after fairly cursory investigations, neither case resulted in further proceedings until early 
2008 when a routine computer check carried out by specialist sexual assault officers 
identified factual similarities in four recorded allegations, leading, inter alia, to the 
reinvestigation of D and V’s claims. Such was the weight of the evidence when it was finally 
pursued that Worboys was arrested very quickly. Around the same time the story broke in 
the media34 and many more women came forward to report their assaults. By the 
                                                          
32 [2016] QB 161(CA); DSD & NBV v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 (HC). 
33 Also known as ‘DSD’ and ‘NBV’ in some reports.  
34 ‘Lotto Lie Cabbie Drugs and Rapes 5 – Hunt for Spiked Bubbly Brute’ The Sun, 15 February 2008.  
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conclusion of a post-trial report carried out by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), 105 
separate complaints involving Worboys had been lodged.35 
D and V sued the police for their investigative failures relying upon the framework of the 
HRA 1998. In 2014, the High Court upheld claims that in the handling and investigation of D 
and V’s complaints, the MPS had breached their obligation under section 6 of the HRA 1998 
not to act in a way which was incompatible with their rights under the ECHR.36  Specifically, 
Mr Justice Green held that under Article 3 ECHR, the police owed a duty to investigate to 
victims of serious crimes of violence perpetrated by private parties which, on the facts 
before him, had been breached.37 Unsurprisingly given the novelty of the holding in a British 
context, the decision was appealed, and in June 2015 the Court of Appeal upheld Green J on 
all essential points, Lord Justice Laws giving a single judgment on behalf of the Court.38  
There can be little doubt that the police handling of the Worboys’ investigation was 
woefully inadequate. In the High Court Green J closely examined the facts, identifying  
… a series of systemic failings which went to the heart of the failure of the police to 
apprehend Worboys and cut short his 5-6 year spree of violent attacks. These 
failures included (i) a substantial failure on the part of the MPS to train relevant 
officers in the intricacies of sexual assaults and in particular drug-facilitated sexual 
assaults [DFSA]; (ii) serious failures … by senior officers to supervise investigations by 
more junior officers and to ensure that they were conducting investigations in 
accordance with the standard procedure mandated for DFSA…; (iii) serious failures in 
the collection and use of intelligence sources to cross-check complaints to see if 
there were linkages between them; (iv) failure to maintain the confidence of victims 
in the integrity of the investigative process… (v) failure to allocate proper resources 
to sexual assaults, including pressure from Borough management to focus resources 
                                                          
35 DSD & NBV v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 (HC) at [87]. 
36 HRA 1998, s 6(1): ‘It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention 
right’.  
37 DSD & NBV v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 (HC), especially at [241, 298 and 
312]. 
38 D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA).  
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on other allegations (of a non-sexual nature) that were easier to clear up and a 
resultant pressure on officers to reject complaints of sexual assault.39     
Focusing on the particular assaults on D and V, Green J continued: 
In addition to these systemic failures, there were numerous individual omissions in 
the specific cases of D and V which reflect the wider systemic failings but which, 
when viewed in isolation, can also be said to be of sufficient seriousness such that 
had they not occurred the MPS would have been capable of capturing Worboys at a 
much earlier point in time.  These failings included matters such as: failure to 
interview vital witnesses, failures to collect key evidence, failures to follow up on 
CCTV; failures to prepare properly for interviews with the suspect etc.40  
In sum, Green J concluded that the police investigation into Worboys’ criminal activities was 
marred by numerous systemic and operational failings impacting directly on the handling of 
D and V’s complaints.  
These are the factual conclusions to which the MPS offered no real dissent. The key 
question was what, if any, legal consequences flowed from them: had any legally 
enforceable rights of D and V been violated, any legally enforceable duties owed by the MPS 
been breached?   
 
IN THE HIGH COURT: THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE DEVELOPED 
As we have seen, existing case law appeared to stand firmly in the way of grounding an 
enforceable claim against the police in negligence for the consequences of failing 
adequately to investigate a crime.41 Perhaps for this reason the claimants based their claim 
on the HRA, drawing both from Art 3 ECHR and the statutory obligations vested in public 
authorities under the HRA 1998.42 This was relatively unexplored territory in a British 
                                                          
39 DSD & NBV v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 (HC) at [13]. 
40 Ibid.  
41 See text above accompanying nn 10-16.   
42 See HRA 1998, s 6 (1) (above n 36) and also s 7(1): ‘A person who claims that a public authority has acted … 
in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may – (a) bring proceedings against the authority under this 
Act in the appropriate court or tribunal’; and s 8(1): ‘In relation to any act… of a public authority which the 
11 
 
context although the Strasbourg jurisprudence on the application of Articles 2 & 3 ECHR to 
the conduct of police investigations was considerably more developed.  Green J began by 
stating that the case raised two questions of law, first whether, under the HRA 1998, the 
police owed a duty to investigate to victims of serious crimes of violence perpetrated by 
third parties and second, if a duty did exist, whether, on the facts, it had been breached. He 
ruled affirmatively on both questions, producing a lengthy synthesis of the relevant ECHR 
case law to support his conclusion that a police duty to investigate in the context of Article 2 
and 3 violations was sufficiently well-established in the Strasbourg jurisprudence to warrant 
its application in a domestic context.  
From where or what precisely did this duty to investigate derive? Green J’s starting point 
was Osman v UK43 in which, as we have seen, the ECtHR recognized that the State obligation 
under Article 2 ECHR (right to life) to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those 
within its jurisdiction could include a positive obligation ‘to take preventative operational 
measures to protect an individual whose life was at risk from the criminal acts of other 
parties’.44  Osman thus established that within the framework of Article 2 a State duty arose 
to protect individuals from serious harm perpetrated by criminal third parties, albeit in 
tightly prescribed circumstances. This duty was subsequently reiterated in a number of 
other cases and extended to encompass Article 3 rights in Z v UK.45 It was recognized by the 
House of Lords as a part of English law in Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police; 
Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police.46 
How though do we get from a duty to protect to a duty to investigate? Green J proceeded to 
show how the developing articulation of the scope of the State’s duty to protect implicitly 
encompassed some minimum requirement of effective official investigation. This implicit 
requirement was rendered explicit in Edwards v UK,47 in which a vulnerable young man was 
                                                          
court finds is … unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it 
considers just and appropriate’. 
43 [1998] ECHR 101. 
44 Osman v UK [1998] ECHR 101 at [115].  
It must be established … that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the 
existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the 
criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers 
which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (at [116]). 
45 [2001] 2 FLR 612.  
46 [2008] UKHL 50. 
47 [2002] 35 EHRR 19. 
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killed by a fellow prisoner while in custody. The ECtHR held that Christopher Edwards’ 
Article 2 rights had been violated not just by the State failure to protect his right to life but 
also because the obligation to protect ‘requires by implication that there should be some 
form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the 
use of force’.48 This ‘procedural obligation’, as it is described in Edwards,49 became the 
primary focus of a detailed exegesis by Green J of the relevant ECHR case law from which he 
derived the existence of a police duty to investigate ‘credible or arguable claims’ of torture 
or degrading or inhuman treatment at the hands of private parties.50 This included 
allegations of rape, as exemplified in the case of MC v Bulgaria,51 in which a claim by the 
applicant rape victim that the Bulgarian authorities had breached her Article 3 and 852 rights 
was upheld by the ECtHR. The substance of MC’s claim was that the state had failed to 
provide effective protection against rape as only cases where the victim had resisted 
actively were prosecuted; and that they had had failed properly to investigate her rape 
claim. On the latter point the ECtHR observed:  
In a number of cases Article 3 of the Convention gives rise to a positive obligation to 
conduct an official investigation. Such positive obligations cannot be considered in 
principle to be limited solely to cases of ill-treatment by state agents’… 53 
     
The MC Court went on to conclude that ‘the effectiveness of the investigation in the 
applicant’s case fell short of the requirements inherent in the State’s positive obligations… 
                                                          
48 Edwards v UK [2002] 35 EHRR 19 at [69]. The Court then went on to observe ‘the essential purpose of such 
investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life’ 
(ibid).  
49 Edwards v UK [2002] 35 EHRR 19 at [65]. 
50 DSD & NBV v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 (HC) at [214]. In addition to the 
cases mentioned above, Green J considered the following ECtHR decisions: Menson v UK [2003] 37 EHRR 
CD220; MC v Bulgaria [2005] 40 EHRR 20; Szula v UK [2007] 44 EHRR SE19; Secic v Croatia [2009] 49 EHRR 408; 
Ali and Ayse Duran v Turkey App No 42942/08 (8th April 2008); Beganovic v Croatia App No 46423/06 (25th 
September 2009); Denis Vasilyev v Russia App No 32704/04 (17th December 2009); Milanovic v Serbia App No 
44614/07 (14th December 2010); CAS & CS v. Romania App No 26692/05 (20th March 2012); Koky & others v 
Slovakia App No 13624/03 (12th June 2012); Sizarev v Ukraine App No 17116/04 (17th January 2013). 
51 [2005] 40 EHRR 20. 
52 Art 8 ECHR: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life…’ The right to respect for private 
life has been interpreted by the ECtHR to include a right to physical integrity and in that sense has been held to 
encompass sexual violations (X & Y v Netherlands A.91 (1985); 8 EHRR 325).   
53 MC v Bulgaria [2005] 40 EHRR 20 at [151]. For a contemporaneous analysis of the scope and potential of MC, 
see J. Conaghan, ‘Extending the Reach of Human Rights to Encompass Victims of Rape: MC v Bulgaria’ 13 Feminist 
Legal Studies (2005) 145. 
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to establish and apply effectively a criminal-law system punishing all forms of rape and 
sexual abuse’.54 
That some duty to investigate existed, including in relation to rape,55 thus seemed clear; but 
what were its parameters? Green J proceeded to draw on the Strasbourg case law to 
articulate a series of principles governing the precise scope and application of the duty.56 He 
stressed, inter alia, that the duty should be understood as an obligation to investigate ‘in an 
efficient and reasonable manner… capable of leading to the identification and punishment 
of the perpetrator’;57 that it should not be regarded as conditional upon the State being 
guilty, directly or indirectly, of misconduct itself;58 that investigative failings which triggered 
a breach could be systemic (legislative or policy failings) or operational (flawed acts and 
omissions of individual officers in the course of the investigation);59 and that the process of 
determining whether an investigation was ‘reasonable’ or ‘capable of leading to the 
apprehension, charge and conviction of a suspect is a fact-sensitive exercise’.60   At the same 
time, he acknowledged ‘the need to avoid an unacceptable burden being imposed on the 
police’, urging a ‘cautious approach to the law’ which did not ‘set [...] the bar for liability at 
too low a level’.61 Green J emphasised that the Strasbourg case law on the duty to 
investigate was ‘coherent, well-evolved and its core tenets… settled’,62 placing an obligation 
on him to accord that body of law significant weight. Nor, he argued, did recognition of a 
duty to investigate open ‘a Pandora’s Box of liability’, as long as it was applied with 
appropriate rigour and due regard to ensure that a ‘disproportionate burden’ did not 
                                                          
54 MC v Bulgaria [2005] 40 EHRR 20 at [185]. 
55 According to Green J in DSD & NBV v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 (HC), 
allegations of crime that were ‘grave’ or ‘serious’ would amount to torture or degrading or inhuman treatment 
for purposes of triggering the duty and this encompassed allegations of rape and serious sexual assault (at 
[215]). 
56 DSD & NBV v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 (HC) at [216]. For a detailed 
elaboration of Green J’s core principles, see [211-224].  
57 Ibid at [216]. 
58 Ibid at [213]. 
59 Ibid at [223]. 
60 Ibid at [224]. Green J also determined that the police duty to investigate covered the entire span of a case 
from investigation to trial (at [212]); the duty was one of means not results, ie a breach of duty occurred where 
the conduct of the investigation fell below the requisite standard, even if it did in fact lead to an arrest, charge 
and conviction (at [217]); the assessment of the efficiency and reasonableness of an investigation should take 
account of its ‘promptitude’ (at [219]), as well as whether the offender was adequately prosecuted (at [220]); 
not every failing attracts liability particularly if such a failing does not go to the capability of the investigation 
to lead to the apprehension and prosecution of an offender (at [221]).  
61 Ibid at [229 (1)].  
62 Ibid at [211].  
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result.63 Applying the (now) settled duty to the individual claims of D and V, Green J 
concluded that in both cases ‘multiple, systemic and operational failures’ had occurred in 
the conduct of the investigations which ‘individually and collectively’ met the test for 
liability under Article 3.64 In a later hearing, he went on to award damages of £22,500 and 
£19,000 to DSD and NBV respectively.  
Green J’s judgment was widely lauded for its creative assemblage of a jurisprudential basis 
to support a duty to investigate;65 but could it stand the scrutiny of appeal? 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL: THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE UNDER CHALLENGE 
The core arguments raised before Green J against the recognition /imposition of a duty to 
investigate were: first, that if a duty existed, it only applied where the police were directly 
implicated in the harm alleged, for example, where injuries were sustained while in police 
custody; second, that insofar as the Strasbourg case law might suggest otherwise, the cases 
relied upon by the claimants were ‘essentially rogue or maverick’66 and should not be 
followed; and third, that existing domestic law was not consistent with the proposed duty to 
investigate. Green J gave all of these arguments fairly short shrift, albeit politely, and there 
is limited direct engagement with the defendant’s arguments in his judgment,67 the judge 
preferring to focus his intellectual energies on successfully plotting the extensive Strasbourg 
case law. This enabled the construction of a clear narrative supporting a duty to investigate 
while simultaneously countering any contentions that the duty was unsupported by case 
law.  
If a lack of close attention to the defendant’s arguments might be regarded as a weakness in 
an otherwise bold and brilliant first instance judgment, this is undoubtedly corrected in the 
Court of Appeal where Laws LJ frames his judgment explicitly around the arguments of 
                                                          
63 Ibid at [241]. 
64 Ibid at [243]. 
65 For a detailed analysis of Green J’s judgement, see J Conaghan, ‘Celebrating Duncan Kennedy’s scholarship: a 
“Crit” analysis of DSD & NBV v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis’ (2014) 5 Transnational Legal Theory 
601. 
66 DSD & NBV v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 (HC) at [227] which includes a 
summary of the defendant’s main submissions. 
67 Ibid at [227-242]. 
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appellant counsel. The judgment is dense and often highly technical. However, from the 
outset, Laws LJ signals a concern to keep sight of what is really at stake: ‘what may be 
thought of as fundamentals of a civilised constitution: the rule of law, and the security and 
protection of people’.68 This sets the tone for a judgment which ultimately eschews 
doctrinal intricacy in favour of a broad brush, value-affirming approach to the interpretation 
of ECHR norms.  Whether this approach will prove effective in entrenching the duty to 
investigate in English law remains open to debate.  
Let’s now take a closer look at the appellant’s arguments in D and their handling by the 
Court of Appeal.  
(a) Article 3 ECHR does not of itself impose any duty of investigation 
This argument essentially challenges the applicability of a duty to investigate in English law. 
Its starting point lies in the text and construction of the HRA 1998. Those familiar with the 
Act know that the definition of ‘Convention rights’, as laid out in s 1(1), specifies ‘Articles 2 
to 12 and 14 of the Convention’ but omits to mention Article 1. This makes complete sense 
to the lawyer as Article 1 does not confer any substantive human right; rather it imposes a 
general obligation on States ‘to secure … the rights and freedoms defined in … the 
Convention’.  The exclusion of Article 1 from the definition of Convention rights has not until 
now been viewed as in any way inhibiting the incorporation of ECHR rights into domestic 
law. Yet the MPS mount an argument claiming precisely this effect. One can spot it lurking in 
the interstices of Green J’s judgment; however, the argument is far more fully fleshed out by 
Jeremy Johnson QC, lead counsel for the MPS, in the Court of Appeal. The thrust of it is that 
the police duty to investigate Article 3 violations is, according to the correct interpretation 
of the relevant case authorities, expressly contingent upon Article 1 so that, in the absence 
of the inclusion of Article 1 in the HRA, the duty to investigate also falls, at least at a 
domestic level.69 To add a further wrinkle of complexity, Mr Johnson draws a distinction 
between the duty to investigate under Article 2 and under Article 3; the former, it is 
                                                          
68 D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [11].  
69 Mr Johnson relies particularly on the ECtHR judgment in Assenov v Bulgaria (1988) 28 EHRR 652 in which the 
Court observes: ‘[Art 3] read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Art 1… requires by implication 
that there should be an effective official investigation’ ([102] cited by Laws LJ in D v Commissioner of Police for 
the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [13]).  As Laws LJ acknowledges, this formulation is also replicated in later 
cases.     
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claimed, is not reliant upon Article 1 because the language of Art 2(1) - ‘Everyone’s right to 
life shall be protected by law’ – is sufficient without more to ground a positive obligation on 
the State.  By contrast, the negative textual construction of Article 3 rights – ‘no one shall be 
subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment…’ – requires the aid of Article 1 to 
support a positive obligation.70  
This is a somewhat formalistic argument which goes against the grain of ECHR 
jurisprudence, as Laws LJ is quick to point out.71 Does it carry weight? It is true that the 
ECtHR have frequently called upon Article 1 to support the development of positive 
obligations on the State in relation to Article 3 violations.72 What is far more contestable is 
that those obligations are formally contingent upon the operation of Article 1. In a sense, it 
is not an issue the Strasbourg Court has ever had to confront: Article 1 is plainly there and 
put to good use.  Does its omission from the HRA fatally flaw that piece of legislation so that 
the extent to which Convention rights enjoy protection under English law is somehow less 
than the Convention itself confers?  
Laws LJ thinks not. Article 1, he argues, does not inform the scope of substantive rights; it 
merely requires they be secured.73 On the idea that there might be a ‘substantial mismatch’ 
between the scope of Article 3 guaranteed by the Convention and under the HRA he is 
equally dismissive; the effect he declares would be ‘bizarre’ and is nowhere evident in 
previous Supreme Court interpretations of the scope and reach of the HRA.74 His Lordship 
highlights the ‘clear scheme’ of the HRA which distinguishes between substantive rights 
under the ECHR and those Convention provisions which ensure support for those rights – 
Article 1 as well as Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) -  pointing to the domestic 
equivalents in sections 6-8 of the HRA.75 Effectively, section 6 – imposing an obligation on 
public authorities not to act in a way which is incompatible with Convention rights – does 
the same job domestically as Article 1 does internationally and this, Laws LJ concludes, 
                                                          
70 D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [13-14].  
71 Ibid at [12].  
72 Mowbray, above n 23, pp 43-65. 
73 D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [15]. 
74 Ibid at [16]. 
75 Above, n 42.  
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surely suffices to explain the omission of Article 1 from the HRA without yielding the 
‘bizarre’ effect for which Mr Johnson contends.    
This analysis is surely correct. In addition to the reasons put forward by Law LJ, it is difficult 
to see how the MPS’s argument that the absence of Article 1 from the HRA precludes the 
imposition of a positive duty to investigate under Art 3 ECHR does not apply to positive 
duties derived from Article 3 more broadly, for example, the duty to protect recognised in Z 
v UK.76 This issue is not directly raised by Mr Johnson; nor does Laws LJ confront it; but if we 
accept that the duties are related, that the duty to investigate is actually derived from the 
duty to protect, then surely both duties are ensnared by Mr Johnson’s argument. Yet the 
English Courts have acknowledged a positive duty on the State to take steps to protect 
individuals from Article 3 violations perpetrated by private parties, particularly with regard 
to local authority failures in the context of child abuse.77 While some of these decisions are 
grounded in negligence, they are clearly, and often explicitly, informed by positive 
obligations under Article 3.78 In fact, the development of public authority liability in this 
context precedes the implementation of the HRA but there is little reason to suspect that 
the introduction of the Act has had the effect – or was intended to have the effect – of 
curtailing the scope of prior English law, let alone, as Laws LJ protests, creating a remedial 
regime in which the schematic construction of the HRA dictates a different outcome.  
 (b) The duty to investigate only applies where the State is complicit in the substantive 
violation  
A central plank of the appellant’s argument is that insofar as a duty to investigate is 
recognised in the Strasbourg jurisprudence, it is confined to cases where the State is directly 
complicit in the alleged breach, as for example, where ill-treatment occurs at the hands of 
State agents.  Laws LJ does not think a great deal of this argument. Commenting on Mr 
Johnson’s efforts to put this particular spin on the case law, he wryly observes that ‘Like 
                                                          
76 (2002) 34 EHRR 3. 
77 See in particular, D v East Berkshire NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1151; D v East Berkshire NHS Trust [2005] 
UKHL 23. 
78 Ibid; see also E v Chief Constable of Royal Ulster Constabulary [2008] UKHL 66 (affirming positive obligation 
on State to protect individuals from infliction by third parties of inhuman or degrading treatment at [44]). 
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many a counsel of despair, this was imaginative’.79 As with Green J, Laws LJ views the ECtHR 
position as unequivocal on this point, supported by a ‘clear and constant line of authority’.80  
He does however give pause to Mr Johnson’s suggestion that, regardless of what the 
Strasbourg position actually is, it should not apply in domestic law. This approach serves as a 
not-so-subtle reminder that Strasbourg law does not have to be slavishly followed. Laws LJ 
agrees that the HRA requirement that courts ‘take into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence 
does not elevate ECtHR decisions to the status of binding precedents.81 At the same time, 
and echoing Green J on this point, he insists that where the relevant authorities are clear 
and established, there must be good reason not to apply them. Mr Johnson offers certain 
decisions of the English courts as just such a reason, highlighting three cases which, he 
maintains, support the view that in a domestic context the Article 3 investigative duty only 
arises in cases of State complicity.82 Laws LJ disagrees, again relying on Green J’s reasoning 
at first instance that as the facts of each of the named cases encompass situations where 
the alleged violence did directly or indirectly involve the State, they do not pertain to cases 
where violence or ill-treatment is inflicted by a private party.83  
Laws LJ’s reading here, both of the Strasbourg and domestic authorities, seems entirely 
plausible and one does wonder at points why he devotes such considerable time addressing 
an argument appearing to have so little colour. All three cases cited by Mr Johnson consider 
the duty to investigate within the context of direct State involvement in alleged breaches of 
Articles 2 and/or 3, and as both Green J in the High Court and Laws LJ in the Court of Appeal 
point out, at least one of them, R(NM) v Secretary of State for Justice,84 expressly 
                                                          
79 D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [23].  
80 Ibid at [25]. 
81 ‘I have long thought… that needless difficulty has been caused by the treatment in this jurisdiction of 
Strasbourg cases almost as if they were domestic law’ (ibid at [25]). Laws LJ’s comments notwithstanding, 
there are repeated examples in the UK case law of clear judicial recognition that the obligation to take 
Strasbourg into account requires considerably less than mindless adherence (S Greer & R Slowe, ‘The 
Conservatives’ Proposals for a British Bill of Rights: Mired in Muddle, Misconception and Misrepresentation?’ 
(2015) European Human Rights Law Review 370, 375).   
82 The key cases upon which the appellants rely are: R(P) v Secretary of State [2010] QB 317; R(Humberstone) v 
Legal Services Commission [2011] 1 WLR 1460; and R(NM) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWCA Civ 
1182.  
83 D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [31-37].    
84 [2012] EWCA Civ 1182. 
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acknowledges a duty to investigate even in the absence of state complicity.85 What then 
does appellant counsel see in these cases which might support his position? Certainly, there 
is clear evidence of judicial caution in the application and development of a duty to 
investigate in English law and a concern in particular with the resource implications thereof. 
As Stanley-Burton LJ observes in R(P) v Secretary of State for Justice, ‘To impose an 
obligation to hold a human rights enquiry has significant resource implications, a matter of 
growing concern when the resources of public authorities are constrained’.86 Similarly, Rix LJ 
in N(M) emphasises the need for a restrictive approach to the application of an investigative 
duty: ‘The investigative obligation, particularly under Article 3, is highly fact-sensitive and 
subject to resource implications’.87 This sounds a little like the policy arguments typically 
invoked to counter negligence claims against the police; mindful of this perhaps, Laws LJ 
takes the opportunity to engage in a short exegesis of the proper relationship between 
human rights and the common law.88 While on the one hand, he expresses the view that, ‘as 
far as possible’, the common law and human rights should cohere – ‘that neither should 
undermine the other’,89 on the other hand he appears to endorse the remarks of Lord 
Brown in Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police; Smith v Chief Constable of 
Sussex Police90 that common law based civil actions serve very different functions to those 
grounded on human rights. As Lord Brown puts it: ‘where civil actions are designed 
essentially to compensate claimants for their losses, Convention claims are intended to 
uphold minimum human rights and to vindicate those rights’.91 I have never found this 
argument particularly convincing, reliant as it is on a rather narrow, artificial construction of 
the scope and function of private law actions. Are such claims never concerned with the 
vindication of rights?92 Is compensation of loss the only lens through which such actions 
                                                          
85 Ibid at [209] cited by Green J in the High Court and then by Laws LJ in the Court of Appeal (D v Commissioner 
of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [34-37]. Allen v CC of Hampshire Constabulary [2013] EWCA 
Civ 967, another authority upon which the MPS relies, also expressly recognises that the investigative duty 
extends beyond state complicity: ‘In principle this [investigative] obligation is not limited to cases of ill-
treatment by state agents’ (per Gross LJ at [43]).  
86 R(P) v Secretary of State [2010] QB 317 at [58]. 
87 R(NM) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWCA Civ 1182 at [29]. 
88 D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [26-30].  
89 Ibid at [27]. 
90 [2008] UKHL 50. 
91 Ibid at [138].  
92 Much here hangs on how ‘rights’ are conceived and understood. For an analysis of the role of rights in 
tortious obligations, see R Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2007).  
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may be viewed? Jenny Steele is rightly sceptical about the analytical robustness of such 
statements of functional distinctiveness observing they are ‘oversimplified and fail[…] to 
capture the breadth of functions associated with the law of tort’.93 Surely, for example, it is 
an acknowledged function of tort law to deter certain kinds of behaviour (for example, bad 
policing)?94 In so far as Laws LJ echoes conventional judicial truths about the relation 
between tort and human rights, his judgment arguably throws limited light on the 
compatibility or otherwise of the two regimes.   
However, putting these objections to one side, the delicious irony of shutting down civil law 
avenues of redress for claimants such as D and V via the judicial placing of clear blue water 
between tort and human rights is that the public policy arguments which have long been 
prayed in aid to support what amounts in practical terms to a blanket police immunity with 
respect to its core functions, are equally distanced. They do not occupy a central place in 
judicial deliberations about the scope of the duty to investigate under Article 3. As Laws LJ 
remarks, rejecting any notion that the scope of liability in negligence should inhibit the 
scope of liability under Article 3, ‘the ECHR and the common law of negligence have 
different aims and so can live together’.95 To put it another way (and he does) just as the 
courts have resisted the view that ‘the common law rule should be moderated to 
accommodate the Convention’, so also should they hesitate before asserting that rights 
under Article 3 should be ‘moderated by the force of the common law’.96 In this sense it 
might be said that the judicial strategy in Smith/Van Colle and Michael to protect the police 
by containing the infectious potential of human rights in relation to common law 
development has rebounded, leaving human rights jurisprudence free to develop beyond 
the constraints which the common law has traditionally placed on the scope of police 
liability.97  
(c) In so far as a duty to investigate does exist, the MPS did not fall short of it  
                                                          
93 J Steele ‘Damages in Tort and under the Human Rights Act: Remedial or Functional Separation’ (2008) CLJ 
606, 607. 
94 T Honore Responsibility and Fault (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999) 68. 
95 D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [30]. 
96 Ibid. 
97 This point is further developed in Conaghan, above n 65.  
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Given the damning facts of this case articulated in such detail by Green J in the High Court, 
one would be tempted - drawing upon a timeworn cliché - to laugh this argument out of 
court. If such a woefully mismanaged investigation should fail to meet the test for breach of 
a duty to investigate, one wonders what sort of investigative failings possibly could. 
Valiantly though, Mr Johnson runs the argument and Laws LJ gives it no shortage of 
consideration.  The approach adopted by appellant counsel here is commendably clever: Mr 
Johnson marshals the various threads of Strasbourg and domestic case law to delineate a 
set of six principles determining different investigative standards depending upon the kind 
of case before the court. These include, for example, the principle that the obligation to 
investigate is less extensive in Article 3 than Article 2 cases; it is also less extensive where 
the perpetrator is a private party rather than a State agent.98 The claims of D and V, the 
argument runs, fall within a category of claims in relation to which lesser degree of 
investigative rigour is required than applied by Green J.  
Again there is a tension here between the formalism of appellant counsel and the more 
holistic, ‘big picture’ approach adopted by the Court of Appeal. Laws LJ does not deny that 
these factors feature in the cases considering the investigative duty. However, he resists the 
conclusion that they should yield different kinds of duty in different contexts. Throughout 
his judgment he stresses that ‘a single principle of protection with varying degrees of rigour 
according to the gravity of the case… represents the true sense of Article 3’.99 According to 
Laws LJ, the scope and extent of the duty to investigate is best understood in terms of a 
‘sliding scale’ in which ‘deliberate torture by State officials’ is located at the top end and ‘the 
consequences of negligence by non-State agents’ occupies the bottom.100 This more fluid 
approach, uncontained by categorical boundaries but nevertheless free to gauge the duty to 
investigate according to context and fact-sensitivity, eschews the rigidity of the categorical 
approach espoused by Mr Johnson, while accommodating, as Law LJ eloquently puts it, ‘the 
nuance which explains the different voices in which the cases speak’.101  
                                                          
98 D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [49].   
99 Ibid at [50]; see also [46]. 
100 Ibid at [45].  
101 Ibid at [62]. Commenting in particular on Mr Johnson’s efforts to draw a categorical line between Art 2 and 
3 cases, Laws LJ remarks that ‘the weakness of Mr Johnson’s argument is that it seeks to elevate potential 
practical differences into rigid differences of principle’ (at [53]).  
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What subtext underlies these unusually erudite judicial remarks? Part of Laws LJ’s anxiety is 
undoubtedly flagged at the commencement of his judgment, where he expresses concern 
that the ‘restrictive reading’ advocated by the MPS gives insufficient weight to the 
fundamental issues at stake in the case, that such a reading fails to take account of the 
‘large canvas’ of values and ideal which underpin the ECHR.102 However, Laws LJ also links 
his nuanced approach to differences in nature between private common law actions and the 
protections offered by the Convention. It is precisely because, ultimately, human rights 
depend upon the overall approach of the State to their protection that they cannot (or 
should not) be easily reducible to separate elements of a claim in the same way that, for 
example, the tort of negligence can.103 In other words, Laws LJ sees the kind of normative 
fluidity he advocates as an inherent aspect of human rights enforcement. He spells this out 
as follows: 
These points of departure between the ECHR and the common law are not merely 
theoretical. They mark important differences in practice… Because the focus of a 
human rights claim is not on loss to the individual but on the maintenance of a 
proper standard of protection, the Court is in principle concerned with the State’s 
overall approach to the relevant ECHR obligation.104 
He goes on to observe that the need to accord a margin of appreciation to States in the 
fulfilment of human rights obligations further illustrates the distinctiveness of human rights 
as opposed to common law norms:  
… a margin of appreciation is … quite foreign to the adjudication of common law 
claims: once the court has ascertained what the relevant duty of care requires, its 
remaining task is to decide whether there has been a breach of duty causing 
damage. No margin of discretion enters the exercise,105  
Laws LJ’s reflections here go beyond the empty truisms he has previously rehearsed 
pertaining to differences between tort law and human rights. These amount to a claim 
which is far more subtle and profound, namely, that there is something in the nature of 
                                                          
102 Ibid at [11].  
103 Ibid at [65]. 
104 Ibid at [67]. 
105 Ibid at [68]. 
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human rights which precludes their taking the particular juridic form we would recognise 
and associate with common law claims. This is an intriguing though also frustrating position 
to take as it leaves the scope and application of the duty to investigate somewhat 
indeterminate. Unsurprisingly, neither appellant nor respondent counsel are particularly 
happy with it. Phillippa Kaufmann QC, counsel for the claimants, attempts to bring clarity to 
matters by positing a tripartite classification of investigative obligations to which particular 
features apply. She distinguishes between a ‘systems duty - the State’s duty to introduce 
and maintain a judicial system that includes process for the investigation of actual or alleged 
events … an adjectival duty triggered only where there is an arguable case that the State 
itself has violated Articles 2, 3 or 4 … and a criminal investigative duty – requiring the 
effective investigation of conduct sufficiently grave to meet the threshold of Article 2, 3 or 4 
whether or not perpetrated by State agents’.106 Her primary purpose in so doing is to 
contain the reach of the domestic authorities which the MPS invoke in support of their 
contention that the duty to investigate is confined to situations in which the state is 
complicit.107 These decisions, she suggests, do not purport to address the ‘criminal 
investigative duty’.108  
 Laws LJ is as unsympathetic to Ms Kaufmann’s submissions as he is to those of the MPS. We 
are thus confronted with two contrasting conceptual approaches to the evolving 
jurisprudence: that of both counsel, seeking to confer upon the duty to investigate clear and 
determinate features permitting, inter alia, some kind of categorical ordering, and that of 
the Court, which resists formal taxonomies and the imposition of too rigid a doctrinal frame, 
preferring instead to conceive of the duty to investigate as contextually prefigured. Allen v 
Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary109 is of central importance here.  Allen 
essentially turned on the extent of the police duty to investigate acts of harassment carried 
out by someone who happened to be a police officer. This factual wrinkle complicated 
matters as it raised the question whether the state was directly complicit in an alleged 
Article 3 breach (via the acts of the police officer) or whether the police merely failed 
                                                          
106 Ibid at [38].  
107 See text above accompanying nn 83 to 89.  
108 Ms Kaufmann actually puts these arguments in relation to ground (b) above but they apply generally to the 
issue of scope and application of the investigative duty (or as Ms Kaufmann maintains, duties). Laws LJ 
summarises these arguments in D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [38-40]. 
109 [2013] EWCA Civ 967. 
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adequately to investigate acts carried out by a private party.  In the event, the Court of 
Appeal determined the latter, proceeding to uphold a first instance judgment striking out 
the Article 3 claim. According to Mr Johnson, this lends support for his argument that the 
scope of the investigative duty in cases where the alleged harm has been perpetrated by a 
private party is very narrow, amounting to no more than a requirement to ensure that 
available enforcement procedures existed to secure citizens’ Article 3 rights.110 Ms 
Kaufmann on the other hand approaches the difficulty she perceives Allen to present by 
isolating the ‘systems duty’ from the ‘criminal investigative duty’ and/or arguing that in so 
far as Allen supported the proposition that her criminal investigative duty did not apply to 
cases in which the State was not complicit, it was incorrect.111   
Laws LJ adopts neither stance. He sees in the language of Gross LJ in Allen the same loosely 
bound approach to the duty to investigate as he himself favours,  ‘I have referred to a sliding 
scale; Gross LJ employed the metaphor of a spectrum. The idea plainly is the same… Allen’s 
case supports the application of a single principle of varying degrees of rigour, which as I 
have suggested represents the true sense of Article 3’s investigative duty’.112 Which of the 
three interpretations of Allen is correct? In truth Gross LJ’s comments on the scope of the 
investigative duty are a little confusing, particularly on the question of whether and when 
the scope of the investigative duty extends beyond cases in which the State is not 
complicit.113 Clearly, however, domestic jurisprudence is moving towards a position which 
recognises the duty varies depending on context; it is, as the judges repeatedly assert, fact-
sensitive. Laws LJ’s sliding scale arguably accommodates what is still an evolving view more 
accurately and certainly more flexibly than the creation of distinct categories. Moreover - 
although this point does not emerge from Law LJ’s judgment - Allen and D are factually quite 
different; specifically D concerns not just operational inadequacies in a one-off criminal 
                                                          
110 Mr Johnson relied in particular on the comments of Gross LJ in Allen v Chief Constable of Hampshire 
Constabulary [2013] EWCA Civ 967 at [43 & 44] considered by Laws LJ in  D v Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis [2016] QB 161(CA) at [59-61]. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid at [60-61]. 
113 For example, at [43], Gross LJ’s text suggests an approach to the application of the duty to investigate which 
is graduated and contextual; but at [44] he quotes with approval from the judgment of Rix LJ in R(AM) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 219 that: ‘In the absence of state complicity the 
essential obligation is only to provide a system under which civil wrongs may be remedied in litigation or 
criminal wrongs investigated or prosecuted..’ (ibid at [29] cited by Gross LJ in Allen v Chief Constable of 
Hampshire Constabulary [2013] EWCA Civ 967 at [44]. This is essentially the claim relied upon by Mr Johnson 
QC.      
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investigation, it also raises systemic issues, that is, issues which challenge the integrity of the 
investigative system in the context of crimes of sexual violence. For this reason (among 
others) the insistence upon a tight typology of investigative duties, as posited by Ms 
Kaufmann, may be unnecessarily restricting.                    
In any event, having dispelled all efforts to create a formal taxonomy of duties to 
investigate, Laws LJ quickly disposes of the appellant’s key claim that there has been no 
breach of duty on the facts, drawing extensively from the analysis of Green J in the High 
Court in which multiple, serious investigative failings in both D and V’s cases are 
painstakingly documented.114 Thus is the MPS appeal resoundingly dismissed in a judgment 
which combines grand aspirations with tight technical analysis, supporting Green J’s initial 
holding that by virtue of their obligation under section 6 HRA, the police have a duty to 
investigate, in an efficient and reasonable manner capable of leading to the identification 
and punishment of the perpetrator, suspected Article 3 violations; and that on the facts, 
that duty has been well and truly breached.  
 
FUTURE(S) OF THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE? 
The most significant feature of D is that it provides a remedy where tort law has consistently 
denied one, certainly in a British context.115 Will it however survive? There are two 
immediate threats; one is the Government plan to repeal the HRA. As things stand, that Act 
forms the legal hook upon which the claim in D hangs. What happens to rights recognised 
under the HRA if the Act is abolished? The duty to investigate will of course still exist as a 
matter of Article 3 ECHR jurisprudence; but will a claimant once again be reduced to 
working her expensive way through the domestic courts before turning to Strasbourg for 
                                                          
114 Ibid at [70-77].  
115 A number of other jurisdictions have recognised a police duty to protect and/or investigate in relation to 
botched rape/sexual assault investigations relying on tort law and /or State-based constitutional rights. See eg 
Doe v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1998), 39 OR (3d) 487 (Ont Ct (gen Div)) 
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relief? Much depends upon what, if anything, the Government put in place of the HRA. The 
stated intent is to ‘put the text of the original Human Rights Convention into primary 
legislation’116 as well as to ‘clarify Convention rights… [to] ensure they are applied in 
accordance with the original intentions for the Convention and the mainstream 
understanding of these rights’.117  This is accompanied by a strongly articulated desire to 
distance British human rights law from any Strasbourg influence and, as the duty to 
investigate is, first and foremost, a product of that Court, its future status in domestic law 
must remain questionable.  
An additional threat to the durability of D is overruling on appeal. At the end of February 
2016, the Supreme Court granted the MPS permission to appeal, with a hearing 
provisionally scheduled for Spring 2017. The grounds of appeal are  
(1) Article 3 is not engaged by ill-treatment to which the State is neither a party nor 
complicit and/or (2) the right to investigation ancillary to Article 3 is confined in 
the case of non-State actors to having put in place the necessary structure but 
does not extend to the operational context of an individual enquiry into a 
particular alleged crime.118 
One assumes appellant arguments will focus on the scope of the duty to investigate within a 
domestic context as clearly the argument that Article 3 is not engaged by ill-treatment to 
which the State is neither party nor complicit cannot be sustained as a matter of European 
Convention law.119 The focus therefore is likely to be upon the extent of domestic 
incorporation of the duty, with appellant counsel striving to contain such incorporation by 
distinguishing between cases in which the State is or is not directly involved and, in the 
latter context, limiting the scope of the investigative duty to a requirement to introduce and 
maintain an effective system of judicial investigation. Respondent counsel is likely to 
counter this approach by inviting the Supreme Court to affirm the existence of distinct duty 
                                                          
116 Conservative Party (2014) Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Law 
(https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/HUMAN_RIGHTS.pdf. [last accessed 
11th April 2016]. 
117 Ibid.  
118 Copy of Supreme Court order kindly provided by Jeremy Johnson QC.  
119 See eg MC v Bulgaria [2005] 40 EHRR 20.  
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categories and to consider the case before them as a manifestation of the ‘criminal 
investigative duty’ (understood to include a duty to conduct an effective criminal 
investigation ‘in practice’) rather than the ‘systems duty’ posited by the appellants.120  
There is merit to this approach – judges do like categories and they can perform useful 
service. However, I would question whether such efforts to tailor the authorities to a clear 
and workable typology are sustainable, given the relatively early stage of domestic 
development of the investigative duty. I also share Laws LJ’s view that the boundaries of 
these allegedly distinct duties are ‘permeable’ and appropriately so.121 As noted above, a 
particular feature of D is that the facts reveal both systemic and operational investigative 
failures; failures which go both to the State duty to introduce and maintain a judicial system 
of investigation (encompassing criminal and civil proceedings) and to the duty requiring an 
effective criminal investigation where suspected Article 3 violations are involved. It is far 
from clear how the judicial finding of both systemic and operational failures in the Worboys’ 
investigation122 maps onto Ms Kaufmann’s three duty categories. Mr Johnson’s attempts to 
tame the investigative duty via the articulation of clear governing ‘principles’ is also less 
than effective.123 Unlike rules, which are binary in their application, principles are scalar; 
they carry variable weight and lack formal dispositive effect.  We have seen how quick Laws 
LJ is to rebrand Mr Johnson’s principles as ‘factors’,124 further weakening their power and 
allowing their easy alignment within the ‘sliding scale’ framework he prefers. Ultimately, at 
the heart of this issue is the extent to which the Supreme Court is likely to treat the 
arguments underpinning the grounds of appeal as containing rather than mediating the 
terrain within which the investigative duty operates. In this respect I incline towards Laws 
LJ’s more flexible and nuanced approach because it facilitates a desirable balance between a 
navigable framework of legal norms and an aspirational project which, by its nature, resists 
containment.   
                                                          
120 See summary of respondents’ arguments in D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 
161(CA) at 172.  
121 Ibid at [42]. 
122 Ibid at [244-284] (systemic) and [285-298] (operational). 
123 See text above accompanying n 99.   
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One further factor likely to influence Supreme Court deliberations is the introduction of 
intervenors’ arguments. Cases like D and Michael inevitably raise issues which reach far 
beyond the concerns of the individual parties involved, inviting strategic interventions from 
activist and civil society organisations. The Worboys case broke at the end of a decade of 
vociferous public debate about the perceived limitations of the criminal justice system in 
general, and police practices in particular, regarding the investigation and prosecution of 
rape complaints.125 Just as Michael126 acted as a clarion cry, mobilising activists seeking to 
improve the way in which the police approach domestic violence, D too is likely to attract 
similar kinds of engagement. Intervenors in Michael included Refuge, Liberty, and Cymorth y 
Ferched Cymru (Welsh Women’s Aid) and clearly their submissions, in particular those of 
Karon Monaghan representing Refuge, shaped the judgment of Court, compelling judicial 
engagement with the broader context of endemic domestic violence and systemic criminal 
justice failures within which Ms Michael’s tragic case was situated.127  
Organizations applying to intervene in D include Rape Crisis of England and Wales, End 
Violence Against Women, and Southall Black Sisters, amongst others.128 The Home Secretary 
is also expected to intervene; one assumes that the concern here will be to protect the 
police from an undesirable burden of liability in the context of their investigative and crime-
suppressing functions. Might the spectre of public policy arguments, historically associated 
with the common law, re-materialize in a HRA context?  Recall that one of the main reasons 
why the common law has resisted the imposition of a duty of care on the police in 
circumstances such as D derives from a judicial concern, repeatedly rehearsed in the case 
law, that the threat of liability will adversely influence the way the police carry out their 
responsibilities, imposing unwarranted financial and administrative burdens which will 
detract from the ability to carry out core police functions.129 This ‘public policy’ concern, 
originally finds expression in Lord Keith’s judgment in Hill v Chief Constable of West 
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126 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales, [2015] UKSC 2. 
127 In his judgment Lord Toulson, who gave the majority judgment, makes repeated reference to Ms 
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128 Information provided by Phillippa Kaufmann QC, April 7th 2016. 
129 For a an elaboration of these concerns, see in particular judgment of Lord Steyn in Brooks v Commissioner 
of Police for the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24 at [30]. 
29 
 
Yorkshire130 and has, with few exceptions, been uncritically reproduced by otherwise more 
discerning judicial minds ever since.131 As Tofaris and Steel point out, there is little concrete 
evidence to support judicial suppositions about the effect on policing posed by the threat of 
liability; their concerns are speculatively rather than empirically derived.132 What empirical 
evidence there is does not support judicial fears. For example, in a study of claims against 
local authorities regarding accidents caused by poor road maintenance, Halliday et al found 
no evidence that the threat of liability unduly inhibited public functions and concluded that 
local authorities tended to be ‘risk aware as opposed to risk averse’.133   
If resource-based public policy arguments are raised in the Supreme Court, it is likely they 
will be robustly contested, particularly by organizations consistently expressing concern 
about how the police handle rape complaints. Put simply, insofar as civil liability might 
indeed induce changes in policing practice, many would argue this is entirely to be desired, 
that public policy is served rather than impeded by such developments. Organizations 
seeking to intervene in D include those who have long campaigned for changes in the way 
the police approach the investigation of rape and other crimes of sexual violence and such 
concerns now prominently feature in public policy discussion around criminal justice.134 The 
perceived public policy challenge is how to embed policies which are agreed but far from 
inscribed in day-to-day police practices. Dame Elish Angiolini, assessing a range of studies as 
part of her recent review of the investigation and prosecution of rape in London, concluded: 
‘A key finding [of the studies] was the consistent approval of the policies applied to the 
investigation and the prosecution of rape, and the identification of an inability to implement 
those same policies comprehensively and successfully’.135  
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132 S Tofaris & S Steel ‘Police Liability in Negligence for Failure to Prevent Crime: Time for a Rethink’ University 
of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No 39/2014. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2469532 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2469532    
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If public policy, or some variation thereof, is raised on behalf of the MPS position, it risks the 
introduction of a mountain of evidence by intervenor organizations strongly supporting a 
claim that serious systemic issues exist in the police handling and disposition of rape 
complaints; such evidence inevitably problematizes unsubstantiated assertions that 
protecting the police from liability is always in the public interest. Moreover, although most 
judges to date have happily subscribed to the view that the threat of tort liability against the 
police will lead to bad outcomes such as defensive policing and the misuse of public 
resources, some have begun to question this position. Writing extra-judicially in 2010, in the 
wake of another failed tort claim against the police brought by a domestic violence victim,136 
Lord Bingham strongly criticised the judicial invocation of fears of defensive policing, 
challenging the view that influencing the way in which the police handled domestic violence 
cases was necessarily to be avoided.137 Indeed, his Lordship speculated that the imperative 
to avoid liability might well have led the police to provide the unfortunate claimant in Smith 
with a better level of protection than he received: ‘it is not easy’ Lord Bingham observed ‘to 
see how such defensive conduct could have done other than fulfil the function of the police 
in preventing the commission of crime and protecting the safety of the public’.138 In her 
dissenting judgment in Michael, Lady Hale makes not dissimilar comments, suggesting that 
expanding the scope of liability ‘might conceivably lead to some much-needed 
improvements in the [police] response to threats of serious domestic abuse’.139 Lord 
Toulson, speaking for the majority in Michael, is more sceptical. He assert that there is no 
evidence that civil liability will improve the policing of domestic violence: ‘the court has no 
way of judging the likely operational consequences of changing the law of negligence…’ 140  
What is interesting about this comment is that the boot has suddenly shifted to the other 
foot. Judges can no longer reiterate unchallenged the view that civil liability will adversely 
affect policing. Rather they are now being required to respond to the assertion that liability 
will confer beneficial effects. In a relatively short time, and notwithstanding the ultimate 
judicial rejection in Michael of the claim that the police owe a duty of care to a domestic 
                                                          
136 Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50.  
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violence victim who has sought their assistance,141 the parameters of the discourse have 
shifted significantly, the weight of legal argument tilting away from a position which has so 
long shielded the police from the consequences of poor policing of crimes of sexual and 
domestic abuse.  
What we are witnessing in this cumulative line of cases, but particularly in D and Michael 
where significant third party interventions are involved, is the harnessing of public 
processes of legal argumentation to broader forms of social and political activism concerned 
with bringing about social change. The courtroom is being repositioned as a forum for airing 
concerns about inadequate policing in the context of gender-inflected crimes of violence 
and abuse. D is remarkable here for its sheer discursive potency. The case powerfully 
illustrates the potential of law as a site of contestation in which the political stakes extend 
well beyond the interests of the immediate parties. Litigation provides a crucial space for 
public discourse with the power to shape and inform public attitudes and beliefs. 
Experience in other jurisdictions suggests that a significant legacy of this type of litigation is 
precisely its capacity to advance public dialogue about the critical issues at stake. For 
example, commenting on Doe v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of 
Police,142 a Canadian case in which the victim of a serial rapist successfully sued the Toronto 
police both in negligence and under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
claimant’s legal counsel, Sean Dewart, has asserted that Doe was a ‘pivotal factor in the 
continuum of events that has brought about [a] change in public attitudes’.143  
In this sense law can sometimes serve as a tool – albeit the effectiveness of which is 
variable- for bringing about change in the behaviour of public bodies where other 
bureaucratic measures have failed.  Cases like D signal a convergence of public legal norms 
with private remedial mechanisms in the context of questions about the accountability and 
legitimacy of state actions.144 Such strategic deployments of law pertain directly to debates 
about the character of civil obligations, highlighting a growing divergence in the role and 
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positioning of private law norms on the one hand and human principles on the other. Within 
tort scholarship, for example, there is a recurring debate about whether civil law obligations 
ought to be viewed and deployed instrumentally as a vehicle for the promotion of wider 
social goals, with the predominant trend being against instrumentalism in favour of a 
narrow conception of the role and purpose of tort in terms of corrective justice.145 Such a 
view, which tends to meet approval in the courts, encourages a perception of tort and 
human rights as pulling in different directions146 and contrasts with approaches which 
advocate greater harmony between human rights and common law norms.147 D is located 
directly in the path of these tensions; indeed, it may credibly be argued that the claimants 
owe their successful outcome precisely to the development of this remedial cleavage 
between tort law and human rights.148 Within this broader frame of strategic engagement 
with law, whether or not a case is won or lost, is not necessarily the most significant marker 
of litigation success.  In offering a final evaluation of the success or failure of the litigation in 
D, these broader considerations should not be overlooked.   
 
 
                                                          
145 See eg E Weinrib The Idea of Private Law. Cambridge (Ma: Harvard University Press, 1995); A Beever, Allan 
Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007); Stevens above n 92.  
146 R Bagshawe ‘Tort Design and Human Rights Thinking’ in D Hoffman (ed) The Impact of the UK Human Rights 
Act on Private Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2011) 110; F Du Bois ‘Human Rights and the Tort Liability of Public 
Authorities’ (2011) 127 LQR 589. 
147 See eg C McIvor ‘Getting Defensive about Police Negligence: the Hill Principle, the Human Rights Act and 
the House of Lords’ (2010) CLJ 133. In contrast to the English courts, the South African Constitutional Court, in 
a not dissimilar context (suit against police and prosecutors for failure to prevent a brutal assault carried out 
by a serious sexual predator while released on bail) stressed the obligation to develop the common law in 
ways which ‘reflect the spirit, purport and objects of the [South African] Bill of Rights’: Carmichele v Ministers 
of Safety and Security, Justice and Constitutional Development 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at [36].   
148 See text accompanying nn 95-97 above. 
